

Neighborhood Planning for Community Revitalization

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**Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design
in the Bancroft Neighborhood**



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by Eric G. Phillips

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NPCR

330 HHH Center

301 19th Avenue South

Minneapolis, MN 55455

phone: 612/625-1020

e-mail: nelso193@maroon.tc.umn.edu

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) in the Bancroft Neighborhood

by Eric G. Phillips

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this report is to review Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as a potential crime prevention strategy for the residents of the Bancroft neighborhood. CPTED is an alternative method of reducing crime which involves a variety of measures, including physical changes to the environment. The goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for potential offenders to commit crimes. It is based on notions of informal social surveillance and territoriality derived from the works of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman.

This report finds several problems with CPTED that limit its applicability in the Bancroft neighborhood. A detailed study of CPTED demonstration projects reveals that long term actual crime rates are usually unaffected by the implementation of this sort of program, and the execution of such a program can meet with strong opposition and delays. Although CPTED has many strong supporters, it also has strong critics, who point to a lack of reliable evidence to demonstrate CPTED's effectiveness. An examination of crimes in the Bancroft neighborhood shows that a CPTED program may be ineffective against certain types of crimes because each crime has its own particular geography.



There may, however, be aspects of CPTED that would be worth pursuing and some areas within Bancroft where implementing CPTED might be useful as part of a comprehensive crime reduction program. One element of CPTED, "target-hardening," which involves improving locks and installing alarms, was the most consistently effective and lasting element of the CPTED demonstration projects examined.

An effort to implement CPTED principles in Bancroft's commercial areas may be an effective way to improve people's perception of those parts of the neighborhood. Residents' discomfort with certain areas may be disproportionately high compared to the actual crime rates. For instance, many residents cited the intersection of Chicago Avenue and East 38th Street as an area they would feel uncomfortable being in at night. Yet the

actual number of reported robberies that occurred in this area was quite low. Therefore efforts to combat vandalism and create more of an appearance of informal surveillance might be an effective means of reducing residents' fears about these areas.

Crimes such as damage to automobiles and theft from automobiles may be effectively reduced by a neighborhood effort to change the character of alleyways. These crimes are arguably more "opportunistic," and they are more likely to be committed by people from outside the immediate area. Many of the crimes classified as burglaries within Bancroft are actually garage break-ins, and the only way to access garages is through the alleys. Therefore efforts to create the appearance of social surveillance may be effective in curbing this type of crime. By better maintaining alleyways and making them appear "semi-private" instead of "semi-public," foot traffic through these areas may be reduced and which will in turn reduce the number of potential offenders who are moving through these areas.

Bancroft and Other Neighborhoods in Minneapolis



1 in = 2 mi

Figure 1: Bancroft and Other Neighborhoods in Minneapolis

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to critically review the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and make recommendations on its implementation in Bancroft, a residential neighborhood on the south side of Minneapolis (Figure 1). Bancroft is bounded by Cedar Avenue South and Chicago Avenue South to the east and west, and by East 38th Street and East 42nd Street to the north and south. This report is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of CPTED and the Bancroft neighborhood.

There are three sections to this report.

In the first section, the concept of CPTED is described, including its three major components: "target hardening," changes to the physical environment, and "community building." Next, this report reviews three case studies where CPTED principles were implemented -- one in Hartford, Connecticut; another in Portland, Oregon; and a third in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Emphasis is placed on the techniques used, and on implementation and effectiveness of the program. The last portion of this section examines criticisms of CPTED.

The second section focuses on the Bancroft neighborhood. First, a brief description of the neighborhood based on information from the 1990 census familiarizes readers with the area. The neighborhood is looked at in a city-wide context in terms of its transportation system and population. The report then focuses on residents' attitudes towards crime in the neighborhood, which includes information from informal conversations with residents as well as surveys and interviews. Lastly, the second section looks at reported incidents of crimes in Bancroft based on data gathered from the Minneapolis Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit. The objectives of looking at these data are to examine the spatial pattern of the reported incidents and make recommendations

for the implementation of crime-prevention strategies based on the distribution of crimes in the study area.

The third and final section of this report contains recommendations for implementing CPTED in the Bancroft neighborhood. The Bancroft Neighborhood Association (BNA) should consider executing these recommendations as part of its plan for the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP). Included in this section are recommendations to implement "target hardening" measures and for improving commercial areas and alleyways in Bancroft.

I. CPTED: Concept and Evaluation

CPTED differs from traditional crime control in that it focuses not on the apprehension and prosecution of offenders, but on preventing the occurrence of crime. The concepts behind CPTED originated from the work of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman. Jacobs, in her book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, put forth the notion that the more "eyes on the street" in a particular location, the less likely it will be that a crime will be committed there. Newman in his book *Defensible Space*, discussed how an individual's sense of territoriality could be enhanced by the surrounding architecture. Given a greater sense of ownership or control, people would theoretically be more likely to protect their property and potential offenders would be inhibited by an area's "sense of place."

CPTED has three basic components, "target hardening," changes to the physical environment, and changes to the social environment (community building). Target hardening refers to methods of making a "target" of a crime less accessible to potential offenders using locks, alarm systems and security cameras. Changes in the physical environment include a variety of methods that are designed to change both the behavior of people who live in the area and how outsiders perceive the area. "Community building" refers to the process of strengthening the ties between individuals and organizations in an area.

This report examines three different attempts to implement CPTED principles. The first took place in a residential neighborhood called Asylum Hill in Hartford, Connecticut. This project focused mainly on changing the physical layout of the streets to make it less accessible to through traffic. The program also included initiatives to strengthen ties between the local police unit and the neighborhood as well as reinforcing local community organizations. The second project was implemented on a commercial corridor known as

Union Avenue in Portland, Oregon. Attempts were made to increase the amount of activity on the street through changes in physical layout as well as a target-hardening campaign and promotional activities. The third project took place in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and focused on three different neighborhoods using a combination of target hardening, physical changes to the environment, and community building.

The CPTED concept has been criticized for several reasons. First, critics assert that the underlying components are poorly defined and the theories are impractical. Second, there is little reliable evidence proving that these methods have an effect, and in cases where the studies have been thorough, there is little indication that CPTED is effective in the long term. Third, it is argued that implementing physical changes in the environment does not actually reduce crime, but merely displaces it. CPTED techniques focus on reducing the opportunity for potential offenders to commit a crime, and may not address other factors which cause crime.

Traditional Crime Control vs. CPTED

Traditional crime control methods involve the apprehension and punishment of offenders. The premise behind this method is that criminals will be either rehabilitated through punishment or they will be kept away from the rest of society and prevented from doing further harm. The response to increased levels of crime, therefore, is to put more police officers on the streets, toughen sentences for offenders and build more prisons (Crowe, 16-18).

This traditional approach to controlling crime does not, however, fully address the crime problem. It addresses the punishment aspect of crime, not the prevention. Although the presence of police officers in a particular area may prevent an offense from occurring there, it is impossible to have a police officer patrolling every part of the city every hour of the day. Although the prospect of incarceration and punishment in theory should deter

criminal offenses, there is no practical evidence to support this argument. There does not appear to be a correlation between the number of prisons built or tougher sentencing and the occurrence of crime. More fundamentally, this approach is geared towards punishing crimes that have already occurred, not preventing them from happening in the first place (Crowe, 9-10).

It has been argued by proponents of CPTED that crimes occur where there are opportunities for criminal acts. If these opportunities were removed, then the number of incidents of crime should be reduced. Factors that create opportunities to commit crime can be found in both the physical and the social environment. For example, if there is inadequate lighting, assailants are able to conceal themselves and remain undetected by potential victims. Similarly, if residents of an area are unfamiliar with each other and avoid questioning strangers about their reasons for being in that area, persons with criminal intent can move freely without being detected.

The Origins of CPTED

Jane Jacobs, in her 1961 book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, first proposed the notion of crime control through environmental design. Jacobs found a correlation between the number of incidents and how many "eyes on the street" there are in a location. Criminal activity could be deterred not only by police officers, but also by the presence of ordinary citizens who might report suspicious or criminal activity to authorities. The more diverse a location is in terms of its activities and uses, the more likely this sort of informal social control will occur. Areas that are relatively deserted experience higher crime rates because the likelihood that an offender will be observed or caught is diminished. It is also true, however, that an area can experience such a high volume of traffic that potential offenders can move about anonymously without fear of being

questioned. In order to create the impression of "eyes on the street," the following things should be done:

- Buildings should be oriented toward the street.
- Clear distinctions should be made between public and private spaces.
- Activities that are seen as unsafe should be placed in areas perceived as safe. Safe activities should be placed in unsafe areas. For instance, automatic teller machines should be relocated from areas that are isolated to places where there is a substantial amount of human activity or a community park could be placed in an area where there are a number of abandoned buildings.
- Each area should have multiple users who use the area at different times so it is always under surveillance.

Oscar Newman, an architect, continued research similar to Jacobs. In his 1972 book *Defensible Space*, he discussed how people's latent "territoriality" could be fostered through changes in the physical environment. The notion that humans display territoriality similar to how animals demarcate and defend their territory was popularized by Robert Ardey in the mid-1960s (Murray, 108). According to Newman, territoriality could be used to create informal social surveillance, leading people to take steps necessary to protect their rights and property. Ways to create informal social surveillance include the creation of real and symbolic barriers, or as Jacobs suggested, creating opportunities for residential surveillance. Newman was also interested in how proper design could alter the visual impact of a neighborhood or housing project. Run-down, neglected areas appear more vulnerable to potential offenders. In his study, Newman showed how public housing

projects worked against the creation of "defensible space" by dividing residents and creating spaces that were actually conducive to criminal activity.

Components of CPTED

Although the concept of environmental design as a deterrent to crime was originally based in physical modifications to the environment, most CPTED programs usually involve three basic components: target hardening, changes to the physical environment, and changes to the social environment or community building. Target hardening refers to methods of making a "target" of a crime less accessible to potential offenders. Changes in the physical environment include a variety of methods designed to influence perceptions of an area by both people who live there and by outsiders. Community building refers to the process of strengthening ties between and among individuals and organizations in an area.

"Target Hardening"

"Target hardening" refers to making a "target," or potential objectives of the criminal, more difficult to obtain, and usually refers to burglary-related crimes. No matter how much a target is "hardened," almost any target can be penetrated (Rubenstein, 15). There are three main devices used for "target hardening:" improved locks, alarm systems, and security cameras. Improving the quality of locks can be an effective deterrent to residential burglary. It is especially important in areas that lack adequate security devices. In many cases, a criminal does not have to overcome a security device to enter the residence. In other instances, the current locks being used may be inadequate. They are either weak or easily broken.

Another method for deterring criminals is through alarm systems. An alarm system alerts neighbors to the fact a home has been broken into. Even if the perpetrator does not immediately flee, it does limit the time he or she has available to take anything of value

because they know the police could arrive at any moment. Without an alarm system a criminal is much less limited by time. A survey of existing studies shows that alarms can have a significant impact on attempted crimes and that arrests associated with sites with alarm systems are significantly higher (Rubenstein, 18-19). Security cameras are also an option, and have been shown to also increase the likelihood that a criminal is apprehended in a commercial setting. They are usually of limited value to residences (Rubenstein, 20-21). One experiment in which a security system was placed in a large apartment building showed that few tenants used the equipment and crime failed to decrease (DuBow, 42). Both alarms and security cameras can be prohibitively expensive for residences.

Another approach is "target removal," that is to reduce the objective of the criminal. For example, one effective way to prevent vandalism in a public area is to eliminate targets that cannot stand up to damage (Poyner, 60).

Changes in the Physical Environment

The second component of CPTED involves changes to the physical environment of a location. These changes are intended to have the effect of either reducing the likelihood that a crime will be committed or increase the likelihood the offender will be caught (Clarke, 139). The physical features of an area that increase a potential target's vulnerability to attack are altered and attempts are made to influence how both legitimate users and potential offenders perceive an area.

One of the most commonly addressed aspects of the physical environment is lighting. Lighting is seen as a deterrent to night-time crimes. The underlying idea is that people will not only feel safer in well-lit areas because potential assailants will be unable to easily conceal themselves, but potential offenders will avoid the risk of committing a crime if they are more likely to be seen (Crowe, 29-30). Although there is a strong indication that increased lighting decreases the fear of crime, there is no statistically significant evidence that street lighting affects the actual level of crime. Most evidence supporting street lighting

as a deterrent to crime is based on untested opinions of police officers (Tien 47, 93).

"Immediate but short-lived reductions were occasionally observed, but evidence of permanent improvement have proved elusive" (Murray, 113).

Features that give potential offenders the ability to hide themselves should be removed. One study showed that 65% of rapes occur in small confined areas with cover from dense vegetation, walls or fences (Fisher, Nasar, 39). Potential offenders desire a hiding place from which they can await, attack, and take a victim out of sight. Offenders look for areas with a high degree of potential refuge for themselves, but a low prospect of escape for the victim. What makes an area dangerous are "blind spots," or "lurk lines," beyond a potential victim's line of sight. These types of areas include places with dense foliage, sharp bends in passageways, or fences (Fisher, Nasar, 38-39; Warr, 894). Burglars also often take into account the amount of "cover" available, that is how obscured a residence is from public view by trees, shrubs, fences and other factors that would allow them to approach a building while remaining out of sight (Hope, 47-50).

Changes that affect how legitimate users and potential offenders perceive an area either increase the amount social surveillance in an area or help to foster a sense of territoriality in residents. Changes that increase the amount of social surveillance in an area of an area involve creating more opportunities for legitimate uses for the area. This idea is similar to Jacob's notions of designating multiple uses to an area that attract activity at different times during the day and putting safe activities in unsafe areas and placing unsafe activities in safe areas. These changes can be made through the improvement or creation of walkways and public spaces such as parks. Changes should be designed to increase the density of people on the street, and as a result there will be more "eyes on the street." Another tactic is to reduce the amount of unassigned open space, such as converting an empty lot into a community activity space. However, in some cases, the introduction of a new land use may have a negative affect of the surrounding area. The creation of a neighborhood school, for instance, because it increases the amount of pedestrian and

vehicle traffic, may reduce the "controlling and challenging behaviors of residents (e.g. staring and verbal challenges)" (Crowe, 148). This negative affect may be curbed by separating the residential area with entrance narrowing devices, walls or columns (Crowe, 153).

The perception that social surveillance exists may be created by making sure an area is cared for and that opportunities for monitoring the area by residents are visible to outsiders. One way to show that an area is cared for by the community is to create a garden plot that is maintained by residents. It is believed that regular maintenance of an area and the rapid attention to damage can reduce the amount of vandalism that occurs because potential offenders fear they will be caught (Poyner, 60). Areas where buildings do not face the street, or without windows looking out onto the sidewalk, are thought to be more susceptible to crime. Without the potential for being seen by someone inside, illegal activity may flourish on the street (Crowe, 45-46; Poyner, 10; Warr, 891).

An example of how differences in the physical environment can affect people's sense of territoriality comes out of Oscar Newman's studies of public housing complexes. Newman found that the larger the number of apartments that form an identifiable group within the building, the stronger the sense of "cohesion" among residents. This cohesion would result in tenants being more likely to solve problems together. In contrast, when there are a greater the number of apartments per floor, this sense of cohesion is affected negatively (Rubenstein, 46-47).

One CPTED technique that makes an area less vulnerable as well as increases social surveillance and residents' sense of territoriality involves changing the physical layout of an area. Spaces are redesigned so that there is less traffic through an area (and therefore less potential offenders) and people unfamiliar with the area encounter difficulty moving through it without being detected. A method used to accomplish this objective involves changing the street plan from a regular grid pattern to a less predictable pattern. The new designs tend to use cul-de-sacs or return-loop layout patterns that prevent through traffic

(Poyner, 15). Streets may also be narrowed at the entryway to a neighborhood to act as a symbolic gate. People entering an area may be required to pass through a control point (Crowe, 153). Changes in the street layout can make it more difficult for someone unfamiliar with the neighborhood to move around without appearing disoriented. Residents will then be able to identify non-legitimate users and question their presence. The reduction of traffic and noise may also encourage more interaction among residents and increase social cohesion (Poyner, 18). Oscar Newman discussed the benefits of private streets in his book "The Private Streets of St. Louis." In his view, where streets had been privatized and residents made legally responsible for the care and maintenance of their streets, there was less through pedestrian and vehicular traffic as well as more of a sense of living in a distinct and separate area (Poyner, 15-17).

Community Building

The third element of CPTED involves changes in the social environment, or "community building." These sorts of changes can have the most impact upon how people perceive the livability of their neighborhood. Community-building attempts to increase residents' sense of ownership of the neighborhood and to make them more conscious of who their neighbors are and who does not belong in their neighborhood. It is believed by proponents of CPTED that people will then be more likely to intervene in suspicious situations and question individuals who appear to lack a legitimate purpose for being in their neighborhood. This intervention should aid in the apprehension of criminals and reduce successful crime, and also reduce attempted crime.

Community building techniques can consist of social events such as local fairs designed to increase the amount of contact between individuals in the neighborhood and to improve their familiarity with each other. A housing rehabilitation loan program will not only improve property values, but will also change the "look and feel" of an area, and that will affect the an outsider's perception of the community. Community building techniques

can also be used as vehicles to implement other aspects of CPTED. For instance, an "alley clean up day" will not only foster a sense of pride in residents, but it will also affect how an area is perceived by making it less unsightly.

Another common community building technique is to foster more contact and dialogue between residents and the local police force. In some cases new police sub-stations have been created, or patrol routes have been modified. Police officers may be involved in CPTED related activities, such as block clubs or a target hardening campaign.

Examples of CPTED

To understand further how CPTED can be used as a crime prevention technique, this report examines three separate case studies. All three were conducted by a federal organization known as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) during the 1970s. The purpose of these projects was to demonstrate CPTED techniques. The LEAA is now known as the National Institute of Justice. Because a variety of techniques were used in all three cases, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the effectiveness of any one technique. Because of the nature of this type of study the luxury of conducting laboratory type experiments to isolate the different effects of variables is absent.

In addition to allowing us to examine the effectiveness of CPTED, these case studies offer a chance to see how CPTED principles have been implemented in different areas, and allow us a sense of how these ideas might look in practice. The studies can also be examined to see what sort of difficulties can be expected in the implementation of CPTED project.

Hartford, Connecticut

One of the most comprehensive attempts to implement CPTED took place in Hartford, Connecticut in a neighborhood known as Asylum Hill. Asylum Hill is located

(Figure 2) near the retail and commercial center of the city, and in 1973, consisted mainly of single, working individuals, young and old. A large percent of the neighborhood population was transient and there was a growing minority population. The housing in Asylum Hill was mainly low-rise apartment houses or two and three family homes. It had once been considered a desirable area to live in but was beginning to show signs of decline (Poyner, 18).




Figure 2: Asylum Hill: Hartford, Connecticut


Source: Poyner, Barry. Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space. London ; Boston: Butterworths, 1983.

Hartford was chosen by the LEAA as a demonstration project using environmental design concepts for three reasons. First, it had neighborhoods with high crime rates that

were considered representative of other neighborhoods nationwide. An organization known as the "Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice" already existed and had a good working relationship with city officials, the police department and the business community. There was also interest from the public and private sector in making capital improvements in the city. The project eventually focused on Asylum Hill because of its high crime rate, its suitable geographic size, and because the area coincided with census tract boundaries (Fowler, 2-3).

There were three major components of the Asylum Hill plan, including physical changes to the environment, improved police strategies and community building activities. The main physical changes in the Asylum Hill were inexpensive changes in the public streets that would restrict non-resident vehicular traffic through the area and channel most of the through traffic onto two major streets (Figure 3). These changes would prevent through-traffic from dominating the residential streets so that residents would no longer feel uncomfortable utilizing outdoor spaces. The dominance of through traffic created an environment where residents avoided outdoor activity and potential offenders felt there was little danger of being caught if they committed a crime. Changes were made by blocking or narrowing key intersections and converting streets into one-ways. In addition to limiting traffic, these street changes visually defined the boundaries of the area. In order to test whether or not physical changes were effective, they were made only to the north half of Asylum Hill. The other two elements of the program, community policing and efforts to strengthen local organizations, were applied to all of Asylum Hill (Fowler, 7-9; 39-41).

The objective of the police strategy was to create an effective neighborhood-centered team. The unit would be relatively autonomous so it could create its own strategies to better serve and work with the residents of Asylum Hill. In addition to that, the local department would collect data on the neighborhood. In order to promote community building, the LEAA project sought to find existing community organizations and help promote them (Fowler, 45-49).



Adapted from Poyner, Barry. Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space. London ; Boston: Butterworths, 1983.

Figure 3: Changes Made in North Asylum Hill

Several problems were encountered in implementing this program. Implementation of the physical changes met with resistance from the community. Adjustments to the original plan had to be made to get approval from the residents, who were concerned with the inconvenience that changes would present. Some residents wished to avoid having to drive farther to get to and from their homes, while others wished to avoid having to walk farther to the bus, which had initially been planned to be rerouted. Service providers were concerned about the effect of the changes on their ability to do their work. Emergency service providers were especially concerned that the cul-de-sacs would reduce the speed at which they were able to respond. Local merchants were concerned that diverting traffic flows would adversely affect their business, and even filed a lawsuit to prevent the city from implementing the plan. The idea of using "knock-down" barriers was abandoned in favor of the use of curbing and traffic signs. When the plan did go forward, it was with the understanding that if residents found the changes to be unacceptable, they would be removed after six months. Problems were also encountered with the financing of the physical changes (Fowler, 75-78).

In the period immediately after the implementation of the project in Asylum Hill, the crime rate for burglaries fell in both parts of Asylum Hill, while continuing to rise in the areas just outside the study area and the city as a whole (Table 1). In the years before the implementation of the project, crime rates had been rising in both North and South Asylum Hill. These changes would appear to suggest that the CPTED program had an effect on reducing crime in the area. Furthermore, north Asylum Hill experienced a substantially larger decrease than did the southern portion of the neighborhood. The evidence for robbery and purse-snatchings is less conclusive, showing a substantial rise in the robbery rate after the conclusion of the program in the southern portion of the neighborhood, while the northwest adjacent area, which was not a part of the CPTED program, remained stable (Table 2).

Table 1: Burglary Victimization by Area (rates per 100 households)

		<u>Before Program Completed</u>		<u>After Program Completed</u>
	1973	1975	1976	1977
North Asylum Hill	7.5	14.8	18.4	10.6
South Asylum Hill	2.2	4.6	7.8	7.7
North and west adjacent area	8.2	10.2	NA	13.7
Total City	9.8	12.1	NA	15.3

Source: Fowler, Floyd J, McCalla, Mary Ellen and Thomas W. Mangione. *Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program*. Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1979.

Table 2: Robbery/Purse-snatch Victimization by Area (rates per 100 persons)

		<u>Before Program Completed</u>		<u>After Program Completed</u>
	1973	1975	1976	1977
North Asylum Hill	2.7	3.6	5.1	3.7
South Asylum Hill	.8	4.1	3.6	7.9
North and west adjacent area	2.0	2.0	NA	2.2
Total City	1.0	2.1	NA	6.5

Source: Fowker, Floyd J, McCalla, Mary Ellen and Thomas W. Mangione. *Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program*. Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1979.

A second evaluation of the Hartford program was done in 1979, two years after the first evaluation. Using the same source of survey data on victimization, it was found that the crime levels had returned to the levels that would be expected if nothing had been done at all. Fear of crime also had not been reduced, although it was lower than in other areas of the city. It was found, however, that informal "social surveillance" was continuing. People would more frequently walk around the neighborhood and believed it was easier to identify strangers or suspicious activity (Poyner, 21).

Portland

Another program that was implemented by the LEAA took place in Portland, Oregon. This project focused more on CPTED in commercial areas, concentrating its efforts on a three and half mile long, four block wide section of the Union Avenue Corridor (UAC). Union Avenue is a north-south thoroughfare located in northeastern Portland just across the Willamette River from the main downtown area of the city (Figure 4). At the time of the project, which was implemented from 1974 through 1978, the UAC consisted of light industry as well as a variety of retail and service establishments, including used car

dealerships, banks, fast-food restaurants, gas stations and drug stores. The surrounding neighborhood varied in quality of housing and consisted of a moderate- to low-income and racially-mixed population. At the time, about half of Portland's black population lived in the general north-northeast area surrounding the UAC (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 5-7).




Figure 4: Northeastern Portland

Source: U.S. Geological Survey. Portland Quadrangle Topographic Map. 1:24,000 scale.

In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the UAC was a thriving commercial strip, but two factors had contributed to its decline. First, by the 1950s, traffic running north-south had been routed away from the strip by Interstate 5. Second, the UAC now had to compete with large suburban shopping malls beginning in 1960s. As a result, the area had begun to decline, and it took on a fortified appearance as businesses closed and predatory crime increased. By 1974, crime rates for robbery, burglary, assault and purse-snatching were about three times higher in the UAC than for the city as a whole (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 7).

With the help of the existing Union Area Redevelopment Program and the Portland Police Bureau's Crime Prevention Unit, the UAC project included the following strategies as part of their CPTED project (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 23-28):

- The creation of a residential activity center, mini plazas and the designation of Knott Street as a "Safe Street for People," which involved physical redesign of streets and intersections as well as improved lighting and massive road improvements on Union Avenue.
- Corridor Promotion -- including planned community events, such as clean-up days and open-air markets as well as organization and support of the business and residential communities and economic development.
- Improved Transportation -- including upgrades to the bus waiting areas and providing special public transportation for the elderly and handicapped.

- Security Advisor Services -- a full-time security advisor would be hired who would conduct security surveys and recommend appropriate "target hardening" techniques to participating businesses and residents.
- Increased Law Enforcement -- similar to the Hartford plan, provisions in the UAC proposal called for improved police patrols and a revision of patrol district boundaries. In addition a storefront police precinct would be designated for the area.
- "Cash off the Streets" Program -- a campaign to actively discourage people from carrying currency and advertising this policy to potential purse-snatchers and robbers.

Westinghouse did an internal evaluation of the program shortly following its implementation. Commercial and residential security surveys, the installation of high intensity and infill street lighting, the creation of a Safe Streets for People, installation of new bus shelters with good opportunities for surveillance, the organization and support of the business community, and the planning of community events were all implemented within the demonstration period. Other proposed improvements, however, were not implemented. These included an eighty unit housing project for the elderly, linked to Union Avenue by a redesigned, safe street; a \$4.5 million road improvement program; and the location of new businesses in corridor (Kushmuk and Whitmore 28-32).

The study also showed that while commercial and residential burglary decreased, there were few changes in other types of crime, such as commercial robbery and street crime (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 42-47). There was no evidence that crime had been "displaced" from Union Avenue to the surrounding area. Nor did the street lighting program show a reduction of crime. There was also little evidence that there were more residents using the area, especially the "Safe Street for People," which was meant to indicate a decreased fear of crime. To the contrary, surveys indicated Union Avenue was

still perceived to have a high crime rate (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 49). On the other hand, business owners had increased confidence in the future of the area and the security advisor had proven to be the one CPTED strategy that was fully implemented was having a lasting effect (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 57-60).

Minneapolis- Willard-Homeward, Lowry Hill East, and Hawthorne

The base of another LEAA project--the Minneapolis program, which took place during the mid-1970s, developed from a grant to the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control which designed a program for three Minneapolis neighborhoods: Whittier, Lowry Hill East and the Hawthorne Neighborhood (Figure 1). Meanwhile the Westinghouse National Issues Center had obtained a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research component of the LEAA. Westinghouse had chosen the Willard-Homeward neighborhood for its demonstration project. Although Whittier eventually dropped out of the project after receiving funds from the Dayton-Hudson corporation, the remaining three neighborhoods became part of a joint project of CPTED implementation with the goal of reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime (Rasmussen, 1-7).

The evaluation of the project included the designation of not only the demonstration neighborhoods, but also displacement control areas in census tracts immediately surrounding the area and statistically similar but non-adjacent control tracts. The data used by the project were to come from criminal offense reports, project records, field interviews and surveys of residents. The criteria for selecting the neighborhoods had been that their crime rate was substantial, but not the highest in the city, and they also contained a variety of socio-economic settings. The neighborhoods varied in population density, presence of commercial strips, homogeneity and the level of community organization (Rasmussen, 9-18).

There were to be four components of the project:

- Increased resident involvement through block clubs, neighborhood-watch groups and business associations.
- Target-hardening projects that would include pressuring landlords to maintain minimum requirements to meet the city's security requirements, security surveys designed to detect areas vulnerable to burglars, and "Operation Identification," a campaign to encourage residents to mark their valuables to make them easier to identify.
- Opportunity reduction through environmental design, which includes improvement of the street lighting, and change the direction of traffic flows on streets and changes in alley access.
- Increased awareness of crime prevention techniques through other programs such as the interaction of block clubs, pamphlets and newsletters, and cooperative interaction between the police and the community.

The community organizing aspect of the program met with mixed results. In Lowry Hill East, 97 percent of all blocks were organized and entered into the neighborhood watch program. In the Hawthorne neighborhood, 92 percent of the blocks were organized into block clubs, but only 58 percent of those participated in the neighborhood watch program. In Willard-Homeward, only 40 percent of the blocks were organized and only 10 percent of those formally participated in the neighborhood watch program. While it promoted different families working together, the community organizing aspect resulted in few other changes. Residents, although they had a positive attitude towards the program, did not perceive that the block clubs had reduced crimes such a burglary (Rasmussen, 223-229).

For the target-hardening portion of the plan, a subsidy was used as an incentive for people to request a security survey for their premises. A total of 266 residents from all the study areas had premise security surveys as a result of the crime prevention demonstration. A survey of those who participated indicated that the majority of them had participated as a result of block club meetings (Rasmussen, 65).

Methods to reduce opportunities for crime through physical changes to the environment varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. In Willard-Homeward, alley changes were made. In one case an arm of a "T" alleyway was closed because it was believed that juveniles were using the dead end as a meeting place, and alleged transactions of stolen goods were taking place there. One arm of the alley was closed off, turning the "T" shape into an "L," using a natural barrier consisting of shrubs and grass. Another change was the installation of new lights in alleyways, replacing mercury-vapor lamps with high pressure sodium vapor lamps that would provide more light. Alley barricades were put up in front of east-west alleys immediately north of Plymouth Avenue to prevent them from being used as short cuts between one way streets. Other changes in Willard-Homeward included the changing of an east-west street into a one-way street and the erection of traffic diverters to control the direction of traffic in the neighborhood. Traffic diverters were also erected in the Hawthorne and Lowry-Hill East neighborhoods (Rasmussen, 78-82).

After a year of implementation, a study was done to evaluate the program and make recommendations. It was found that although there were technical difficulties with implementing the security home surveys, residents were generally enthusiastic about the program. A total of 57 percent of the residents who had premise security surveys made at least some of the recommended changes within the project's first year. Over a third of those who implemented these changes would not have done so without the subsidy the program made available. In the first year of the program \$1,931.10 was disbursed to 48 residential participants in the subsidy program, with an average subsidy of \$40.23. The

campaign for people to mark their valuables did not generate a response, nor was much action taken to increase landlord accountability because it proved impractical to implement (Rasmussen, 229-33).

The evaluation of the Minneapolis project revealed that many of the physical changes through environmental design had not been implemented. Only minor changes had been implemented, and in one area, traffic diverters that had been erected were removed due to objections from residents. Temporary barricades were found to be too unsightly by residents and the report recommended against using temporary construction that must remain in place for a long period of time. The progress of the physical design aspect of the plan was also impeded by delays in preparing designs and securing coordination with other city departments. One program was successful. Expanding the role of crime-prevention block clubs to enlarge the scope of traditional alley- and spring-clean up programs provided a visible and important role for those groups (Rasmussen, 233).

Criticisms of CPTED

The concept of CPTED has been criticized for several reasons. First, the underlying components are poorly defined and often the theories are impractical. Second, there is little reliable evidence to prove that these methods are effective, and in those cases where the studies have been thorough, there is little indication that CPTED is effective. Third, it is argued that implementing physical changes in the environment does not actually reduce crime, but merely displaces it.

CPTED is Poorly Defined

Critics have raised questions about the underlying assumptions of CPTED. Oscar Newman's concept of territoriality has been focused on in particular. Newman is said to be

too metaphorical. His notion of territoriality is not clearly defined nor is it practical. Bill Hillier cites archeological and anthropological evidence which, he claims, discredits the theory that humans are "territorial" (Webb, 177-8) Ellis contends that what Newman calls "territoriality" cannot be explained "purely in terms of a set of responses to characteristics of the built form" (Webb, 178). Newman further assumes that people are willing to exercise a policing function and that they would take advantage of policing opportunities (Taylor et al., 53-67). Psychological experiments in which persons are exposed to staged incidents show there is a substantial gap between perceiving that a crime is taking place and intervening (DuBow, 49).

Methods such as changing the street layout of an area to limit through traffic assume that offenders in an area are coming from outside the immediate area and are unfamiliar with the area they are preying on. Studies show, however, many criminals operate in areas close to their own residence (Repetto, 174; Murray, 118; Pyle 32-33). Burglars often have a sophisticated knowledge of their potential target. Burglars usually locate a target during the course of their daily activities and keep it under surveillance for a period of time. Sometimes a burglar will select a target because they know the victim personally or they have received a tip from someone with inside knowledge of the place (Wright, Decker, 101). To identify a specific site to operate in, the robbers may keep contending sites under surveillance. This surveillance can be precise and systematic. Those engaged in detailed planning may even go to the trouble of renting an apartment overlooking the site (Gabor et al, 59)

The social surveillance rationale relies on the assumption that merely creating the appearance of social surveillance is enough to deter criminals. However, criminals are usually aware of how much surveillance is occurring. Merely creating opportunities for surveillance will be an ineffective crime deterrent if potential offenders believe the area is not actually being watched. An offender's calculations when deciding whether or not to commit a crime are based on the real risk of apprehension, not on symbolic barriers or the

appearance of social cohesion (Murray, 118). It has also not been determined if potential offenders actually perceive defensible space features (Murray, 110).

One study attempted to examine the differences of race, class and income between high and low crime areas to discover what role social surveillance took in these neighborhoods. If the idea of defensible space and "territoriality" is correct, then the areas with lower crime rates should show more evidence of informal social control such as movement governing and surveillance. It was found, however, that people who lived in higher crime area exhibited a greater tendency to engage in informal social control, and that it seemed to be more indicative of a crime problem than as a means of crime prevention. There was also little evidence of greater social ties in low crime neighborhoods than in high crime neighborhoods (Greenburg et al., 1984, 117-123).

Few Reliable Studies Supporting CPTED

A second criticism of CPTED is that the studies done to demonstrate it as a viable solution to crime control have been poorly conducted, and reliable studies do not show significant results.

Newman's principles of defensible space do not stand up empirically. The data is weak, and in many cases, "statistically non-significant" (Webb, 177). Even where significant results do occur there is no way to be certain that the changes were actually the result of the environmental changes. No study has been able to associate physical changes with behavioral changes (Rubenstein, 61). Studies which attempt to test the social surveillance and social cohesion rationales have "resulted in contradictory findings." Moreover, "the behavior changes predicted by the community building rationales (e.g., increased social cohesion) have consistently failed to appear" (Murray, 110-111). Data are especially lacking on offenders' perceptions.

The methodology of many studies has also been found to be deficient. Critics point out that "social and socio-economic factors are not adequately controlled and that

Newman's use of criminal statistics is too uncritical" (Webb, 177). The data from many of these analyses lack comparison with previous trends and lack control groups with which to compare the changes made to an area. Therefore, the changes that the studies observe cannot be distinguished from trends that may be affecting the area as a whole, and may not be related to the changes in design that are implemented. For example, the analytic power of Kohn's implementation of Newman's defensible space principles at Clason Point and Markham Gardens was constrained by the fact that the physical design changes between the two areas were substantially different (Rubenstein, 58). Studies attempting to demonstrate CPTED have failed to adequately define how an individual perceives their territory and how their perception and behavior can be affected by design (Taylor, 53-67).

The Displacement Phenomenon

The third major criticism of CPTED concerns whether or not crime will simply be moved to other areas where no similar programs are in place. This movement is referred to as the "displacement phenomenon." Opponents of CPTED contend that criminals will shift to another time, target, place or type of crime. For instance, if police patrols are increased in the evening, then crimes will occur more during the afternoon. Or, if there are more anti-theft devices installed in homes, than burglars will switch to robbery.

One study has indicated, however, that some crimes are so opportunistic that they will not simply be displaced. Even in instances where offenders are prevented from operating in one area, they would commit crimes in another. Limits and costs, such as mobility and transportation costs, will lessen their ability to do this (Davidson, 147-8). So for opportunistic crime, the overall rate will decline. The displacement phenomenon assumes that the offender population is deterministic (i.e., an offender will commit a certain number of crimes over a given time period regardless of the associated risks). It also assumes that offenders possess "total mobility in regards to crime, time, tactics, target and

area." This assumption ignores the fact that a crime may be opportunistic, done on impulse when a situation presents itself to the offender (Repetto, 169-70).

It has also been shown that certain criminals have differing ranges. A survey of young burglars has shown that they tend to be bound to a small geographical area due to their lack of transportation and their lack of information about areas immediately outside their own neighborhoods. Similarly, a study of street muggers indicated that it is important for these individuals to know the turf on which they operate. Offenders, according to interviews, traveled an average of half a mile to commit each robbery. An analysis of offender histories showed that ninety-three percent of the offenses occurred within one and a half miles of the offender's residence (Repetto, 174).

There is also evidence to suggest that the choice of the type of crime is particular to the individual. For instance, an offender might chose burglary because of a reluctance to risk a confrontation with the victim, and would not be likely to turn to robbery if opportunities for burglary were reduced. Likewise, juveniles committing acts of vandalism will not necessarily turn to some other type of offense, such as robbery. It must be kept in mind that the data from these studies are based on surveys of criminals who have been caught, and therefore may not be a representative sample. It does, however, suggest, that while displacement could result if CPTED principles were applied over a limited area, the broader the geographic scope of the project, the more likely it is to have an impact (Repetto, 175-77).

Other Limitations of CPTED

CPTED is based on the notion that crime is the result of opportunity. There are, however, many other theories on what causes crime. CPTED may have some effect on crime in an area, but it does not address other issues that influence crime.

The focus of CPTED is the reduction of the opportunity to commit crimes. However, it should be kept in mind that there may be many other factors involved in what

motivates an individual to be involved in criminal activity. Criminal behavior has also been attributed as being a cultural rite of passage for adolescent boys seeking manhood, the clash of a dominant culture with a disenfranchised subculture, and a learned behavior that is transmitted from one generation to the next as a way of life. Crime can be seen as the actions of individuals who justify their behavior on their own moral terms and also as a type of behavior that can be correlated geographically with socio-economic variables such as poverty, illiteracy and occupation (Pyle et al, 10-22). Another perspective on neighborhood design and crime suggests that the effects of physical design of buildings, sites and neighborhoods on crime are less important than the degree of access of potential offenders and the supply of potential targets and witnesses, as opposed to informal social surveillance (Greenburg, Rohe; 1984, 49-50).

A CPTED program if implemented may influence some factors that may cause crime, but it would not address other factors such as the economic situation of an area, the lack of investment in infrastructure and the absence of sources of income for an area's residents. A CPTED program would not address the long-term trends that affect a small area. The Portland project provides a good example. The initial reasons attributed to Union Avenue's decline were changing patterns of commuting and retailing (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 7). While the negative reputation and the neglect of maintenance contributed to a spiraling pattern of dis-investment, it was far from the only contributing factor. A CPTED program is meant to prevent crime in a localized context and cannot be expected to reduce the overall crime rate dramatically. It may reduce the danger level of a particular site, but it does not affect the overall crime situation.

Some CPTED programs also suffer from a "Field of Dreams" mentality--an "if you build it, they will come," attitude towards preventing crime through informal social surveillance. The Portland example again provides an example of this phenomenon. The creation of a "Safe Street for People" on the Union Avenue Corridor did not meet the expectations of its proponents, who believed it would attract more local people to the area

and consequently appear to be more safe. While the project was completed, it did not attract residents who still felt it was dangerous to use the area.

The projects that were implemented in Hartford, Portland and Minneapolis demonstrate that implementing a CPTED program can be costly and time consuming, and often the results can be minimal or only short term. The required financing for all these projects came from outside sources such as the federal government or a large corporation. The process was slow, and the proposals met with opposition from a variety of sources, some of which severely curtailed the implementation of the project.

Summary of CPTED

CPTED differs from traditional crime prevention techniques because it attempts to prevent crimes rather than focus on the apprehension and punishment for crimes that have already been committed. The objective is to modify the environment in ways that reduce opportunities to commit criminal acts.

CPTED originates from early theories about how informal social surveillance, or "eyes of the street," affect the perceived safety of an area and from beliefs that the physical layout of a space could invoke latent territoriality within people that would lead to informal surveillance of an area. Most CPTED programs involve three basic components, including target hardening, physical changes to the environment and community building. CPTED principles have been implemented in three separate projects by the LEAA in Hartford, Portland and Minneapolis. In examining the results of these programs and literature reviews of CPTED literature, it appears that target hardening is the most effective crime prevention strategy. The physical-design aspect of these programs proved to be difficult to implement because of lack of funds and local opposition. Furthermore there is little evidence that these activities reduce crime in an area for any substantial period of time. Community-building activities have been shown to have mixed results. Although local

newspapers and other media were effectively used in the Minneapolis program to raise the awareness of crime issues (Rasmussen, 84-86), attempts to promote activity in Portland seemed to have stalled not long after the demonstration period (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 32). Technical difficulties were encountered with having police work more closely with the neighborhood, but these provisions of the plan seemed to be more stable than the physical changes that were made.

The concepts underlying CPTED, such as social surveillance and territoriality are poorly defined and often based on false assumptions (i.e., that people will intervene if they see a crime in progress). There is also little evidence to show that CPTED programs are effective in reducing the crime rate of an area. Studies conducted on the subject employed poor methodology or produced inconclusive results. A third criticism of CPTED is the possibility that CPTED merely displaces crime and does not reduce it. However, the "displacement phenomenon" may not be that great a problem because of the limited mobility of criminals and the particular nature of different crimes. CPTED is based solely on preventing the opportunity for crime, so it only addresses site specific concerns, and will not affect the overall crime situation or other conditions that may lead to individual criminal behavior.

Ultimately, although CPTED is a different approach to reducing crime rates, it is by no means a cure-all solution. While target hardening methods have been shown to be an effective method of reducing crimes, changes in the physical and social environment have not been proven effective. A CPTED program, if implemented, will probably not dramatically affect the actual occurrence of crime. It may however, have an important impact on how people perceive crime in an area. If people's fear of crime in an area is disproportionately high compared with how much crime is actually occurring, a CPTED program could have an impact on the quality of life of its residents.

II. The Bancroft Neighborhood

Background on the Neighborhood

Population Characteristics

Bancroft is a mostly residential neighborhood located in South Minneapolis between East 38th Street and East 42nd and Chicago Avenue and Cedar Avenue. It is named after Geo. Bancroft School, an elementary school located on 38th Street between 13th and 14th Avenues. In 1990, it had a population of 3,377 people, which is a slight decrease from its 1980 population of 3,539 (Bancroft Neighborhood: Planning Information Base, 1-5).



Figure 5: Housing in Bancroft, Chicago Avenue

The neighborhood is zoned primarily for single family homes, with zones of higher density development allowed along Chicago Avenue, Cedar Avenue and East 38th Street as well as in an area occupied by a shopping center and several nearby apartment blocks on Bloomington Avenue. There are no industrial districts within Bancroft (Bancroft Neighborhood: Planning Information Base, 16-17).

The majority of the population in Bancroft is white, with large numbers of residents counting German, Swedish, Norwegian or Irish among their ancestries. Over 18 percent of the population is comprised of minorities, with over 13 percent of these African-Americans. This amount is a substantial increase from the 1980 minority population, which was just under 12 percent of the total population (Census of Population and Housing).

Currently, 1,862 people (55%) of Bancroft's population are in the labor force. The most prevalent types of employment include workers involved in health services, retail, FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) and other professional and related services. The median household income in 1989 was \$31,672. Only 5.5 percent of the total population in Bancroft lives below the poverty level. Just over 7.5 percent of the labor force was unemployed in 1989. The majority of Bancroft's population commutes to work by car. Over 69 percent of workers over 16 years old drove and almost 10 percent used car pools. Over 13 percent used public transportation and just over 6 percent worked at home or walked to their destination. The mean travel time to work for the working population was 19 minutes (Census of Population and Housing).

The majority of the housing units in the neighborhood were built prior to 1940 and are single family homes with two to three bedrooms. They are, for the most part, oriented east-west along the north-south streets of the neighborhoods. Typically, garages are detached from the main house and are set back in an alley that is used communally by a block. Bancroft is located in an area that is a transition zone between apartments to the

north and single family homes to the south (Bancroft Neighborhood: Planning Information Base).

Location Relative to the Rest of the City

Housing in Bancroft initially developed along the extension of the street car lines from the central city. In their book *Where We Live: The Residential Districts of Minneapolis and St. Paul*, Judith Martin and David Lanegran classified Bancroft as part of the "settled Mid-City zone." These areas have never been the home of the elite, but has been the home of middle-class families and are "the proverbial nice older neighborhoods." The neighborhoods in this category lack the spectacular houses founded in other older districts of the city, and are therefore more susceptible to change. These areas have in general maintained their character because of features that attract middle-class families such as excellent designs, proximity to public transportation or amenities such as parks, lakes, or other recreational facilities.

Like many of the other areas in the settled mid-city district, Bancroft is bounded by busy streets that were once streetcar lines. Commercial sites originally developed near intersections of street car lines to take advantage of the business generated by streetcar riders. However, the development of a strip mall on Bloomington obviously took place after the automobile became the dominant mode of transportation. The presence of the parking lot at the mall indicates an attempt to integrate the automobile into the old streetcar-based landscape.

Chicago, Cedar and Bloomington avenues have continued to be heavy traffic generators. These streets experience high volumes of traffic relative to the surrounding residential streets as they act as collector and arterial streets for the whole transportation network . They also continue to be routes for public transportation, although the street car has been replaced by the MCTO bus. There are 6 routes that pass through Bancroft or the

streets that border the neighborhood, including the 5,14, 22, 23, express routes, as well as University of Minnesota shuttle, which is contracted independently .

Perceptions of Crime in Bancroft

Informal interviews and a survey of Bancroft residents by the author indicated that crime within the neighborhood is not a major concern of most residents. While some residents have had experiences with burglaries or thefts from their cars, they did not feel that it was anything out of the ordinary or that crime in Bancroft was any worse than in other part of Minneapolis.

As part of a survey conducted for this report, residents were asked to indicate on a map of the Bancroft neighborhood areas they felt were unsafe using black dots. Many residents tended to place their dots on the outer edge of the neighborhood. The most frequently indicated area of concern was the intersection of East 38th Street and Chicago Avenue. Residents also cited areas of concern along the other major arterial streets that bound the neighborhood, and a few indicated concern about the local strip mall on Bloomington Avenue.

While filling out this survey, residents cited the presence of individuals who appeared only to be "hanging out." There was concern about the level of activity and the amount of traffic that passed through the area. Also, areas were frequently identified based on reputation or an incident that had recently occurred at the site, such as a shooting. Residents who expressed concerns about certain areas, such as 38th and Chicago admitted they often did not visit that area, and that their perceptions were based largely on passing through the intersection on their way to and from home. One resident, however, said that he often went to businesses located on 38th and Chicago because he lived near that area, and did not think that it was really a "problem area."



Figure 6: The Intersection of East 38th Street and Chicago Avenue South

One concern that many residents voiced was about absentee landlords who do not keep up their property and do not properly screen their tenants. This lack of maintenance, according to residents, is allowing undesirable elements into the neighborhood, and perhaps even attracting them. Many residents also felt that there is too much rental housing in the neighborhood.

Interviews

As part of this study, interviews were conducted with four local business owners and a member of the staff from Bancroft school in order to find out what their perceptions were of crime in the area. The people interviewed included Tom Perez, who owns Tom's Furniture at the corner of 38th and Chicago; Carol Simdorn, who operates Nokomis Lanes, a bowling alley located on Bloomington Avenue; Bev Munsen, the owner of "What's Cooking," a restaurant also located on Bloomington Avenue; Brian Peterson, who owns Peterson Hardware on the corner of Bloomington and 38th; and Jane Ellis, who is the Assistant Principal at Bancroft School. All of those interviewed felt that crime was not a

large problem in the neighborhood. All of them had previously been involved in efforts to prevent crime and were positive towards implementing some sort of change in the physical environment.

Tom Perez

Tom Perez has been operating Tom's Furniture at the corner of 38th and Chicago for seven years. Tom himself lives in Richfield and has lived there for the past five years. Prior to that he lived near 60th and Chicago. He says his store has a fairly wide distribution of customers. About 50 percent of his customers come from Minneapolis and about fifty percent come from the suburbs.

Perez says he has had "his share of problems, especially over the summer." He cited gang related shootings at the corner, especially during the summer, as a concern. He hears a lot of concerns from customers who come, especially when they're asking for directions to find the store. When he mentions that the store is at the corner of 38th and Chicago customers often ask "wasn't there a shooting there?" Perez also says there has been "lots of" graffiti by the bus stop. He is also concerned about the presence of young kids.

Perez would like to see more police, especially on Lake Street. He thinks police take too long to respond to calls, and as a result criminals feel they can get away with a certain amount of activity. Perez says he would likely intervene by calling to police if he saw any suspicious activity at the corner, but he would not get involved himself.

Crime prevention steps Perez has taken include installing an alarm system that goes directly to the police station and installing extra lighting at the bus stop with funds from MCTO. MCTO installed the lighting and pays the monthly power bill.

Carol Simdorn

Carol Simdorn has been operating Nokomis Lanes at the Bloomington strip mall for over 15 years. She herself lives on 44th and 28th, near Lake Hiawatha. As far as she is concerned, crime is all over the cities, north and south, and not in any one particular location. Overall, Bancroft is not any worse than any other part of the cities. Carol says she has had some problems in the parking lot. She also says some of her customers "think its rough to come here."

Simdorn would like to see more police coming around and going through the neighborhood, but there need to be more police everywhere. She says they have also thought about using security cameras.

Bev Munsen

Bev Munsen has been operating "What's Cooking," a restaurant at the Bloomington Strip Mall, for about ten years. The restaurant, according to Munsen, has a "large range," drawing people even from the outer suburbs. Many local people walk and bus there, partly because there are few restaurants in the immediate area.

Munsen believes there are generally few problems at the restaurant, limited mainly to minor thefts and purses being taken, though there are a variety of crimes in the neighborhood. She is aware that houses have been broken into and cars have been stolen as well as the occurrence of a break-in at the bowling alley.

She says some of her customers have expressed concerns about the crime level and are worried about coming there, especially after dark. Munsen says the one thing that has affected the look and feel of the area most is the moving of new businesses into formerly vacant areas, such as Coast to Coast hardware and the Laundromat at the Bloomington strip mall.

Munsen is concerned about the recent number of turnovers in the neighborhood's housing and is worried that has led to a situation where people don't know each other.

Munsen believes this instability and lack of community is a major problem when it comes to crime. She sees block clubs as a positive solution to this problem and is glad they are catching on.

Brian Peterson

Brian Peterson has owned Peterson's Hardware at the corner of Bloomington and 38th for 9 years, though the store has been in the family for 40 years. He has been working at the store since 6th grade and has been involved with the business for 30 years. He himself has lived in Bloomington for the past ten years. Peterson says he knows the neighborhood well and about 80 percent of his business is from the Bancroft neighborhood.

Peterson believes crime has increased in the years he has owned the store. His sense is that the "border" of crime was Lake Street, and that the "crime scene" has been moving farther south. Bancroft itself has no real pockets of crime, except for maybe a few drug houses. A lot of the problem has to do with non-owner occupied buildings. His sense is that Powderhorn Park has more non-owner occupied structures. Peterson believes absentee landlords who don't maintain their property or properly screen their tenants are partly responsible for high crime in that area. But for the most part, the apartment complexes in Bancroft, such as Bush Terrace, are nicely kept up. Peterson is concerned with the random nature of crime, though he himself hasn't had a break-in for a while and he says about 90 percent of the people who come into the store "are good, hardworking" people. Peterson says that older customers who have lived in the area for a while are afraid that crime is too close and are moving away. Younger people seem to be more likely to have the attitude that the area is "crime free."

Peterson sees the media's labeling of "South Minneapolis" as a high crime area as something that hurts the area. Although it is true you have to keep doors locked and must be careful at night, Peterson doesn't see that as different from anywhere else. There are

occasional problems with graffiti. He thinks there are good neighborhood groups in Bancroft.

Jane Ellis

Jane Ellis has been working at Bancroft school for six years. Although she lives in downtown Minneapolis, she is very familiar with the neighborhood. It is part of her job description to be involved in the area and to be aware of issues facing the neighborhood. She reads the Southside newspaper cover to cover. She cites 38th and Chicago as a problem area, and is concerned with Chicago all the way up to Lake Street. She is not comfortable having kids play at Phelps and Powderhorn park.

She believes that within the past two and a half years, crime incidents have escalated at the school. There have been more frequent reports of strangers in the building and precautions have been taken. The front doors are typically locked and there is only one entrance that visitors have access to during the school day. There have also been incidents of petty thievery, especially of teacher's purses, which tends to escalate at the end of the month as bills are due and budgets are thin. The school has also been using security cameras. Parents and families want the school to be welcoming and there is concern with alienating them, but that must be balanced with security concerns.

Ellis is concerned with transient housing in the area. Turnover rates are "incredible" and she refers to these as "slumlord properties." There is also a lack of upkeep on this housing. Another problem is crack houses, which she is aware of through students. She believes there are some houses on Elliot Avenue that are problem properties. However, the police make this difficult to confirm. The amount of bureaucracy she has to go through to have them investigated so she can change a bus stop is frustrating. Many of the problems, Ellis believes, could be solved by better screening applicants for apartments and duplexes. She feels that they are "inviting" these people in by having lower standards. She believes this especially a problem for Section Eight housing. She refers to the pattern

of landlords to failing to screen their tenants and then evicting them because of their behavior only to have that tenant rent from another landlord who also fails to check their background as the "dance of the lemon."

Ellis says only about 20 percent of kids at the school are from Bancroft. This makes community building difficult. After school activities can't be provided because of the high cost of busing children after the events are over. The school itself is no longer integrated with the surrounding area, but instead is an island. Neighbors of the school have to deal with the traffic and the noise, without receiving any benefits. She would like to see more efforts to bring the community and the school together, more events and cooperative ventures. One project that is designed to do this is the new school playground which is currently under construction. Much work was done with the community to make sure the school's playground could be a resource for children in the surrounding housing as well as the school children. This effort has included getting tot-safe equipment, and making the area more accessible.

Occurrence of Crime in Bancroft

As part of this study, data were obtained from the Minneapolis Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit. The time period included the months of June, July and August for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. This approach was used to avoid the costs incurred in obtaining the data, as the Crime Analysis Unit charges \$5.00 per quarter year. A period of three years was chosen to try and achieve a sense of what sort of patterns can be seen over a long time interval and to prevent the assumption that a year with an abnormal number of incidents represented the norm. The summer months were chosen because that is when the most crimes are reported, which would ensure that a large enough sample was collected.

The study area examined included the Bancroft neighborhood and selected adjacent areas. Although a larger study area may have been more informative and provided a better

regional picture of crimes in the Bancroft area, it was felt that the emphasis should remain on Bancroft. This way residents examining the data would be prevented from focusing on areas of high crime outside Bancroft, where the Neighborhood Association will not be directing its resources. Also, using a smaller area kept the amount of data manageable and kept it from becoming the main focus of the project. The study area has a north-south bias in part because of the limitations of the Crime Analysis Unit's computer software.

Because these crimes have been separated out by type, it is easier to make observations about patterns specific to different types of crime. The crimes chosen for this study included robbery, burglary, damage to property and vehicle related crimes. These were chosen for two reasons. First they are crimes that could reasonably be influenced by environmental design. Crimes such as domestic abuse or white collar crime were ignored because they are not thought to be influenced by aspects of environmental design. Second, these crimes were chosen because they are more frequent in the Bancroft area. Cases of assault were ignored because it was believed there would be an insufficient number of cases to see a pattern.

The objective of looking at this data is to identify patterns of reported crimes in the neighborhood and determine whether or not a CPTED program would be an effective way of dealing with crime in Bancroft.

Limitations of the Data

There are certain problems with the quality of the data and with displaying them. The maps included in this portion of the report are maps of reported crimes, and it cannot be assumed that they are wholly accurate depictions of crime in the area. Unfortunately, what may have been the most instructive element of this study is the lack of knowledge we have about the occurrence of crime, which makes it difficult to judge the effectiveness of any implementation of CPTED. Many incidents go unreported, especially if the victim fears reprisal, or does not want to call the police because they themselves are involved in

illegal activity. Furthermore, the data as presented does not differentiate the severity of the crime. Reports of damage to property fail to indicate the severity or the degree of damage.

In looking at the computer generated maps there are certain limitations to the presentation of the data. First, if a crime occurs more than once at a location, there is no way to detect that fact from the maps. Therefore multiple incidents may have occurred at a location despite the fact there appears to be only one marker there. Accurate counts of the number of incidents of a particular crime during the study period are indicated in the legend to give the reader an indication of how closely the distribution on the map reflects the number of crimes that occurred. A second limitation results from an attribute that is inherent to the computer software used to display the information. All blocks are assumed to have one hundred addresses on them between one street and another (i.e., addresses on the section of a street between 38th street and 39th street will range from 3800 to 3898). The computer then places a point on a block according to where it would sit on the number line. Therefore, an address of 3844 would be placed approximately in the middle of the block, even though in reality it would be at the end of the block. This problem can be seen in the following maps (Figures 12 - 21). If a line is drawn through the center of the blocks, it would appear that no crimes occurred on the south half of the blocks. This facet of the program is not a problem when mapping areas on a larger scale. However, it can lead to distortions when viewed at the neighborhood level. Crime plots are accurate as block totals, but not as exact locations.

Even with these limitations in mind, these maps provide an extraordinarily detailed depiction of different crimes that occur in the Bancroft neighborhood and the surrounding area.

Robbery

Robberies are incidents where a person is confronted by the criminal and robbed of either money or a possession. Robbery is an infrequent occurrence in Bancroft. For the


total time period observed, only 67 robberies occurred over the entire study area, and less than a third of those occurred with the Bancroft neighborhood. Over a period of nine months, when criminal activity is at its peak, fewer than 30 incidents occurred within the boundaries of the Bancroft neighborhood. Most clusters that appear on an aggregated map for the three years are made up of only three incidents.

Robberies tend to be located in the northwest portion of the study area. The largest cluster is at the corner of Chicago Avenue South and East 35th Street. The fact that more incidents are to the north corresponds with a city-wide pattern where incidents of crime are highest south of the central business district, and diminish in concentration as distance from that area increases. The clustering of incidents to the west reflects the influence of the Chicago Avenue Corridor, which is a heavily trafficked mixed use thoroughfare that suffers heavily from blight. Robberies are not only associated with Chicago Avenue itself, but also with Columbus Avenue South and Elliot Avenue South, to the immediate east and west. It may be likely that offenders are following their victims off the main street and preying on them once they are off the main thoroughfare.

There are few incidents in the center of the neighborhood. Despite the presence of the strip mall, there are only two reported instances in that area, and both of those took place in the same year. Furthermore, Cedar Avenue, which has the highest traffic volume of the major streets in the area, as well as mixed land use and high density structures has few instances of reported robberies.

Robbery is unique among the crimes selected for this study in that the majority of robberies have a known time of occurrence. Crimes such as burglary and vandalism occur during long time intervals that prevent us from knowing what time of day they took place. In the case of robberies, the victims are able to give specific time intervals between when the crime began and when it ended, and robberies rarely last more than a few minutes. This fact allows us to make generalizations about the time of reported robberies. For the

purpose of this study, the time a robbery was reported to have begun was used to plot a map not only of where robberies occurred, but when.



Source: Minneapolis Crime Analysis Unit (based on a twenty-four hour clock)

Figure 7: Distribution of Reported Robberies by Time

Robberies occur far more frequently in the evening, which appears to correspond to people's fears about being out alone at night (Figure 7). But it can also be seen that the number of incidents rises sharply at about 2:00 PM (1400) and the peak actually occurs at 6:00 PM (1800). This pattern suggests that lighting is not the only relevant factor in the occurrence of these crimes. The lack of informal social surveillance could be a contributing factor in crimes taking place late at night. However, since the number of crimes peaks in the late afternoon and early evening, when an increase in activity would be likely as people leave work and run errands before returning home, this hypothesis would appear to be inaccurate. Overall, these are small numbers, with the peak hour having only nine incidents total for the entire study area.

When mapped, these data show us that many of the robberies that occurred in the afternoon between 1:00 and 4:00 PM occurred in the Bancroft area (Figure 11). If we keep in mind that there may be daylight as late as 9:30 PM in the summer months in the Twin

Cities, it is clear that the majority of incidents in Bancroft are occurring during daylight hours. The implication of this is that it is not lighting in these areas that is the problem, because clearly that would not be an issue during the middle of the day.




Figure 8: Robbery in Bancroft, 1993




Figure 9: Robbery in Bancroft, 1994






Figure 10: Robbery in Bancroft, 1995

Time of Reported Robberies in the Bancroft Neighborhood and Selected Surrounding Area

June through August, 1993-1995



Source: Minneapolis Crime
Analysis Unit

Figure 11: Robbery in Bancroft Plotted by Time

Burglary

Burglaries are crimes in which the offender enters a dwelling unit with the intent to steal an item or items. A 1971 study showed that the majority of burglars tend to be young, with almost 83 percent of arrested burglars under 25 and over 51 percent were under 18 (Pyle et al., 22-23). There is also a strong correlation between areas with high burglary rates and areas with high offender rates. That is to say, burglaries are more likely to be committed by offenders who live in that area (Boggs, 903)

As in the case of robbery, there are more incidents in the northwest portion of the study area, but the difference in the distribution is not as pronounced. Unlike robbery, there is not a distinct correlation between major thoroughfares and areas with a high number of incidents (Figures 12 - 14). There does appear to be a larger number of incidents in areas that are more "central." Fourteenth Avenue South, which runs through the center of the neighborhood has the fewest reported incidents during the period. The most heavily trafficked streets, including Chicago Avenue South, Cedar, Bloomington and East 38th Street have comparatively few incidents. For two out of the three years of the study, on the portion of Chicago avenue that borders Bancroft, no incidents of burglary took place. This fact is more significant when it is taken into consideration that the absolute number of dwelling units, or potential targets, is actually higher on these streets than in other portions of the study area due to the number of apartment buildings.

Streets without large amounts of traffic, however, do have a higher number of incidents of burglary, such as Eleventh Avenue South, and Seventeenth Avenue South. These are primarily residential streets, and both have little access to public areas, such as commercial areas or parks. This phenomenon would appear to confirm Jacobs' "eyes on the street" hypothesis and corresponds with Bill Hillier's finding that more segregated dwellings are more likely to be burgled (Hillier, 79). However, 12th Avenue South, which is adjacent to 11th Avenue South, is also not a major thoroughfare and lacks access to a

public area, has a low number of incidents. Therefore we can not draw any firm conclusions about the effect of "eyes on the street."

Streets with high volumes of traffic, commercial areas, or apartments are not associated with a disproportionate number of crimes. Instead, isolated residential streets that do have these features seem to have the largest number of reported burglaries of the study period. This pattern seems logical in that burglary is a crime that requires stealth, so criminals would probably be disinclined to engage in burglary where there are high volumes of people. Unfortunately, we lack enough data to make generalizations about when burglaries occur. The time interval between when a person leaves his/her residence and returns to discover it has been burglarized may be days, if not weeks. However, in a neighborhood where almost 70 percent of the labor force commutes to work by car, it is unlikely that there is much in the way of informal social surveillance occurring during the day, which would provide potential offenders with plenty of opportunity to move through the neighborhood without being detected. This point, however, brings up a more important question: How likely is it that a program focusing on informal social surveillance will be effective in addressing this sort of crime when the population available to provide that surveillance is extremely small? It would appear to be unlikely.




Figure 12: Burglary, 1993




Figure 13: Burglary, 1994




Figure 14: Burglary, 1995

Damage to Property

Vandalism crimes classified as "damage to property" (excluding automobiles) tend to cluster near heavily trafficked streets (Figures 16-18). Higher numbers of vandalism related crimes occurred near or on Chicago, Cedar and Bloomington Avenues. Clusters are especially prominent near commercial areas, such as the Bloomington Avenue strip mall, the corner of 38th and Bloomington, and the intersection of Chicago and 38th. In 1994, the Bancroft neighborhood and surrounding area suffered a rash of vandalism (Figure 17). According to residents this was related to a gang "turf war" that was concentrated near the intersection of Chicago and 38th. The community instituted a campaign to remove the vandalism that resulted, and since then, the number of incidents has decreased.

Crimes classified as "damage to automobiles," seen alongside damage to property, do not appear to coincide with heavily trafficked corridors. Although there are clusters along the major arterial streets, the pattern of incidents is generally dispersed throughout the study area. In fact, in 1993, there was a large concentration of damage to automobiles located in the center of the neighborhood. In both damage to property and damage to automobiles there are more incidents in the north portion of the study area and fewer in the south. However, in the case of damage to cars, there is not a heavier concentration to the west as is the case with other types of crime.

The conclusions we can draw from these observations are that vandalism to property coincides with heavily trafficked areas, and efforts to reduce this crime should be focused on areas that have large numbers of people moving through them. Efforts to curb vandalism of property may be ineffective in curbing damage to automobiles, because the two types of events appear to be dependent on the different factors. It is possible that the high dispersion rate of damage to automobile is related to the fact that crimes are being reported from the home of the victim, which may not be where the damage was inflicted. It is worth noting, however, that there are few, and in fact for two of the three years, no

reports of damage to a motor vehicle on Bloomington Avenue. This lack of incidents is relevant because it is one of the few places where a concentration of parking exists in the Bancroft neighborhood and it is an area with a large number of people coming and going. Despite the concentration of motor vehicles in this area, and the higher number of potential offenders, there is a distinct absence of incidents. In contrast, a large number of incidents were reported on Cedar Avenue, south of 41st Street, where there is relatively little parking available.

Like many of the crimes being examined in this study, many incidents of vandalism are not reported as occurring at a precise time. The time interval during which the incident may have occurred may be many hours, or even days. However, for about two thirds of the incidents a specific time interval is known. In order to analyze the data, incidents of damage to property where the reported "beginning time" and "ending time" of the crime is one hour or less were separated out and plotted on a histogram by time (Figure 15). This group of incidents may not accurately reflect the actual distribution of all the damage to property crimes. Many reports were not used because the time interval during which the incident took place was too great. For instance, the extremely low number of reported incidents during the day may be because those crimes that do occur during the day are not reported until someone returns in the evening. It is clear that many incidents are taking place at night, with a large portion of them occurring after midnight. This trend would seem to support Jacob's "eyes on the street" hypothesis, as clearly a large number of incidents are occurring when there is little social surveillance. However, given the low level of human activity that occurs after midnight, it would no doubt be difficult to create a sense that there is social surveillance occurring at these times.




Figure 15: Distribution of Incidents of Damage to Property by Time




Figure 16: Damage Detail, 1993




Figure 17: Damage Detail, 1994




Figure 18: Damage Detail, 1995

Vehicle Crimes

Data on vehicle related crimes were collected as part of the study. The maps generated by the Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit show four categories of vehicle crimes--motor-vehicle theft, recovered stolen vehicle, theft from auto, and damage to auto. For many of these crimes there is de-concentration of incidents from north to south. Of the 33 total incidents of recovered stolen motor vehicles, only one occurred south of 42nd street, while the majority of the incidents occurred north of 38th street. However, "theft from auto" is more evenly distributed throughout the study area. A greater concentration of crimes can be seen in the west part of the study area.

Motor vehicle theft is highly dispersed and follows no clear pattern. Incidents occur both in heavily trafficked areas and in isolated areas. This lack of correlation also appears to be the case for theft from auto. With the exception of the data from 1995, when a large number of thefts from autos were reported on Cedar Avenue south of 42nd Street, these incidents do not appear to cluster along heavily trafficked corridors. Bloomington Avenue South, as noted before, has few incidents reported on it despite the high number of cars and of potential offenders. The random nature of these crimes may be a result of the fact that auto related crimes have a low correlation between occurrence rates and offender rates (Boggs, 903). That would mean individuals responsible for these crimes are coming from other areas, they lack a sophisticated knowledge of the area they are committing their offenses in. In that sense, this is perhaps the most "opportunistic" of crimes.




Figure 19: Vehicle Crimes, 1993




Figure 20: Vehicle Crimes, 1994




Figure 21: Vehicle Crimes, 1995

Summary on the Occurrence of Crime in Bancroft

The purpose of looking at these data on different crimes in Bancroft was to examine the distribution of the patterns to either confirm or deny assumptions of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, and to provide a base for recommendations for implementing CPTED in Bancroft.

The distribution of different crimes differs widely in number and geographical location. In almost all of the types of crimes looked at there was a strong bias to the north and west portion of the study area, reflecting larger, city-wide trends. In the case of robbery, it was found that the number of actual incidents is quite small, and it is difficult to discern a pattern. Many of the robberies occurred during daylight hours, and that would appear to suggest that street-lighting is not necessarily the dominant causal factor. Burglaries tend to occur on streets primarily made up of single family residential homes and in areas without access to public spaces. Although this pattern supports the idea that informal social surveillance can limit crime, because there are large portions of the population who are gone during the day, it is unlikely that this strategy will be effective. Crimes that involve damage to property show a strong correlation to heavily trafficked areas, especially at busy intersections and commercial areas. The distribution of times of the incidents, when such information is available, shows that a large number of incidents occur late in the evening and after midnight. This pattern would seem to support the idea that "eyes on the street," deter crime, it fails to supply a remedy to solve that problem.

Summary on the Bancroft Neighborhood

The Bancroft neighborhood is a middle-class, residential area located in South Minneapolis. From informal conversations with a variety of residents and the lack of

participation in neighborhood sponsored crime events, it appears as though crime is not a major concern in the Bancroft neighborhood. The areas they are most concerned about are on the peripheries of the neighborhood, most notably at the intersection of Chicago Avenue South and East 38th Street. Business owners also do not see crime as a large problem, although their customers, who sometimes come from all over the Twin Cities, do have negative perceptions about the area. One of the most frequently cited problems is absentee landlords who do not maintain their property.

Data collected from the Minneapolis Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit show that the pattern of crime varies from one type of incident to another. Although some conclusions can be drawn, given the limited amount of data available on crime, it is difficult to evaluate the concepts of CPTED and to make specific recommendations for its implementation. It is clear that informal social surveillance may have limited effectiveness in Bancroft and it would also be difficult to accurately evaluate a CPTED program's effectiveness in reducing the crime rate.

III. The Implementation of CPTED in the Bancroft Neighborhood

Summary of Recommendations

The final portion of this report includes recommendations for implementing CPTED in the Bancroft neighborhood. It is recommended that the Bancroft Neighborhood Association (BNA) implement target hardening measures because those have been shown the most effective at reducing crime. The two areas where physical changes should be made include commercial areas and alleyways behind houses. The BNA should continue with other community projects currently in progress as part of its Neighborhood Action Plan. While implementing these programs, special attention should be made to insure that people are involved, so they become more familiar with the neighborhood. Finally, it is recommended that the BNA do further research in other issues, such as absentee landlords, to determine how to address resident concerns.

Target Hardening in Bancroft

According to Karen Skrivseth of Community Crime Prevention SAFE (CCP SAFE), a large percentage of burglaries in the Bancroft neighborhood are actually garage break-ins, and many of these are unforced entries. In addition, one resident mentioned the lack of adequate security devices on the windows of elderly residents' homes.

Therefore, the first recommendation of this report is that the neighborhood concentrate its crime prevention resources on a target-hardening campaign. This program should include making a security survey available to residents, or helping to make information available. The neighborhood may also wish to offer a subsidy to residents

who participate in the campaign for security devices. Target hardening has been shown to be the most effective means of reducing crime in an area, and in comprehensive CPTED programs, such as the one implemented in Portland, it has been the most successful part of the program.

Changes to the Physical Environment in Bancroft

The two major areas where resources should be focused to change the physical appearance of Bancroft are the alleyways and commercial areas. Both of these areas can be linked either to people's perception of crime or the actual occurrence of reported crimes. Many of the changes that may be made could be funded through other BNA projects with similar goals. Other solutions to changing the physical environment, such as changing the street layout or creating new community spaces, are not recommended because of the expense involved, the difficulty in implementing such changes and the lack of demonstrated effectiveness over a long period of time.

Improvement of Commercial Areas

The most effective areas for the Bancroft Neighborhood Association to consider implementing the physical change aspect of CPTED would be the commercial areas in and around the neighborhood. CPTED techniques should be implemented at the intersection of 38th and Chicago and at the Bloomington Avenue strip mall. A survey of residents has indicated that these are the areas that residents feel are most unsafe. Because there is little evidence to suggest that CPTED has an impact on crime rates, it should not be expected that the crime rate itself will drop significantly in these areas. Instead, these changes should be designed to improve people's perceptions of the area, and thus improve the quality of life in the neighborhood. An important factor that has contributed to the "unsafe" feeling of many

of these commercial areas is the fact they have deteriorated and do not appear well maintained.

The BNA should explore the possibility of changing the exterior of buildings so that there is better surveillance of the street immediately outside the business. This need is especially apparent at the intersections of 38th and Bloomington, 38th and Chicago, and 42nd and Cedar (Figure 22). Currently these are areas faced with blank walls where there is evidence that they have been subject to vandalism such as graffiti. There is no sense that surveillance is occurring from the buildings. Not only do people feel unsafe but the lack of surveillance may actually attract illegal activity.

If it is possible, the BNA should consider helping business owners add to the number of windows on the buildings. If not, then the character of these walls should be changed so they do not attract vandalism. By painting these walls with murals or covering them with ivy, graffiti can be discouraged.



Figure 22: East 38th Street and Bloomington Avenue

The BNA should work to bring businesses into the area that will attract residents to the commercial areas. One resident told me that there were few businesses at the intersection of 38th and Chicago that she patronized. In my interview with Brian Peterson, he indicated he was not as familiar with the businesses in that area as he was with other parts of the neighborhood. It may be that because few people go there, most people have a poor impression of it, as they are limited to what is seen when driving through. Efforts should be made to attract businesses to the area that residents from the neighborhood would be attracted to and use. This effort would increase residents' familiarity with the area and prevent it from simply being stereotyped as a "high crime area." It will also help to redefine the area in a way that reflects the values of the neighborhood, and will appear attractive to people moving through the area. Drawing in neighborhood residents would also provide social surveillance of the area by people who are not transient, such as the people who are waiting for the bus, but rather by people who have "ownership" of the area.

Improvement of Alleyways

One type of crime that may be addressed by CPTED are vehicle crimes such as damage to auto and theft from auto. Unlike burglary and robbery, in which the offender seeks out a specific target, automobile crimes are more likely to be spur of the moment incidents because of the offender's lack of familiarity with the area. These crimes are also more likely to be committed by someone from outside the immediate area. Therefore the appearance of social surveillance may be an effective deterrent to these incidents. A focus for such a prevention effort would be the alley - ways where neighborhood residents park their cars.

The Bancroft neighborhood, like many of the residential neighborhoods in Minneapolis, has a network of alleyways that run behind the housing. These alleyways provide a convenient form of off-street parking as well as an area to place waste receptacles

for pickup. In the case of the Bancroft neighborhood, these alleys run from north to south with one entrance/exit on either end of the block. The alleys parallel the streets, but are semi-private spaces. These alleys would be another area where physical changes might be implemented in the Bancroft neighborhood. These areas could be better defined by making physical changes that highlight the area's semi-private status and show a sense of ownership to the area. Furthermore attempts could be made to increase social surveillance by removing obstacles and increasing the visibility of the alley from the houses surrounding it.

Alleys are often the most neglected area of the residential neighborhood. They are cramped spaces and the presence of the detached garages offers a multitude of hiding places for a potential offender. Because they are off the street, there may be a tendency for residents not to take care of their portion of the alley because the majority of people will never see the area. Furthermore, many people put up fences between the alley's pavement and their backyards, in some cases creating a "no man's" land where nobody appears to own the alley itself. In some cases, fences are built so that there is little opportunity for surveillance from the yard or house on the other side. Alleys can become a dumping ground for unwanted items, such as old tires or used furniture. Alleys may also become a play area for children if there is no other suitable area nearby (St. Paul PED).




Figure 23: View of a Bancroft Alley Looking North



Figure 24: Area Lacking Surveillance in an Alley



Figure 25: View of Bancroft Alley Showing "Disowned Territory"

These factors contribute to the sense that no one owns the alley. Instead of being "semi-private," it takes on the appearance of a "semi-public" space. This may lead people to feel they can go through alleys without danger of trespassing. It may also make residents less concerned with people moving through the alley, and less likely to question whether someone is there legitimately or not. This allows potential offenders, especially offenders who may commit crimes on the spur of the moment, access to people's private space and belongings.

It is therefore recommended that improvements be made to change the character of these alleyways so they no longer appear to be "semi-public," but are once again, clearly "semi-private." There should be an increase in the sense of ownership of the area by residents and a decrease in the accessibility to non-residents.

One simple way to do this would be to make sure that the alleys are well maintained. The amount of litter and discarded material should be kept to a minimum. It

would also be worth investigating different trash collection methods that would discourage residents from using the alley as a dumping ground for their trash and unwanted belongings. Another option to be considered would be some sort of barrier, real or symbolic, at the entrances and exits of alleys. This could be done with a simple marker device.

Creating informal social surveillance and reducing opportunities for concealment is more difficult. Many of the structures in the alley, such as fences and garages, may reduce the potential for informal social surveillance, but removing them would be costly and would encounter opposition. Fences that obstruct a house's view on the alley may have been put up deliberately and the owner might be reluctant to have it removed. The garages, while they reduce the visibility of these areas, are functional. It is doubtful that any residents would want to give up their garage with the prospect of their car not starting in the harsh Minnesota winter. Garages also serve to protect cars from vandalism. Therefore, the Bancroft Neighborhood Association may want to consider encouraging homeowners not to put up obstructing fences, but it is unlikely that any other initiative in this direction would be successful.

Finally, it is recommended that the BNA or block-group develop projects that utilize the space inside of alleyways (perhaps for community or small garden plots), have regular alley clean-up days when the weather permits, encourage residents to watch over their alleyways, and perhaps designate someone from the block to do a quick walk through the alleyway during the day. One potential project the BNA could sponsor would be a survey of the alleyways to determine which alleys are in need of the most improvement. The BNA could also encourage alley clean-ups by awarding some sort of prize on periodic basis to the blocks with the best maintained alleyways, based on their cleanliness and their "sense of place."

Other Physical Improvements

A concern that many residents and some of the business owners cited was the lack of care absentee landlords put into their rental properties. It is recommended that the neighborhood initiate a survey of absentee landlord properties to determine which properties are being poorly maintained, have frequent incidents of crime, and lack adequate security such as locks or a controlled entrance. This survey can be accomplished through a visual inspection of the property based on a list of set criteria, information from the Minneapolis Police Department and interviews with residents.

Community Building in Bancroft

Although the community building rationale may be an important to contributing to the quality of life in the neighborhood, it is recommended that the Bancroft neighborhood avoid using funds designated for crime prevention to address the community building aspect of CPTED beyond the organization of block clubs. Because the goals of community building are consistent with the goals of other BNA activities, any effort to incorporate this aspect of CPTED might lead to unnecessary duplication and devour scarce resources that might be more effective elsewhere.

Instead, the BNA should encourage the various committees in its organization to keep CPTED principles in mind when they implement different projects. For example, if the garden committee plans to create a neighborhood garden plot, they may want to consider locating it in an area that is perceived as unsafe. That is, do as Jane Jacobs suggests and place a "safe activity" in an "unsafe location." That sort of project would give an area a more desirable "sense of place" as well as provide informal social surveillance when people work at the garden plot. Other committees might sponsor neighborhood events such as block parties that would increase interaction between residents, or a program that would encourage residents to walk their dogs at a certain time. These activities do not

necessarily have to have a crime focus. It is more important that residents become more familiar with each other and take pride in their community. Support for these activities could possibly be found in the local business community.

The BNA should also consider working closely with Bancroft school to implement community building projects. Jane Ellis, the assistant principal at Bancroft school has expressed an interest in creating more interaction with the neighborhood and with Minneapolis's return to "neighborhood" schools, the BNA has the opportunity to make the school a focus for neighborhood-oriented activity. Jane Ellis mentioned that she would like to hold a dedication ceremony for the school's new playground in the spring when the improvements are finished. The neighborhood should also consider implementing a "walk with your child to school" event so parents can interact more with the school and become aware of what sorts of difficulties their children encounter on the way to school everyday.

It is recommended that the BNA continue its efforts to get its business involved in either a neighborhood or regional business association. Such a step would encourage businesses to take more interest in the community, in turn fostering connections between the residents and the businesses. It will also encourage businesses to watch over each other's property. In my interview with Brian Peterson, he said that the gas station across the street often looks after his business after it has closed. This sort of activity needs to be supported and further developed.

Conclusion

The purpose of this report was to critically review the concept of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design and then provide recommendations for specific proposals for the Bancroft Neighborhood.

It has been found that CPTED is a different approach to solving crime problems, in that it focuses on prevention instead of apprehension and incarceration, but focuses attention on one particular aspect that may cause crime, and that is opportunity. CPTED relies heavily on people's sense of "territoriality" and the use of informal social surveillance as a method of reducing crime.

Certain components of CPTED have been shown to be ineffective at reducing crime. Changing the layout of the streets has been shown to be difficult to implement because of local opposition, and the effects on crime are negligible. Furthermore, it has been shown that more segregated dwellings are more subject to burglary. The creation of "neighborhood safe spots" may be ineffective if people still perceive it as a high crime area and do not use the space. Increasing the amount of street lighting may not affect the number of robberies occurring in Bancroft, as many happen during daylight hours.

CPTED's reliance on informal social surveillance may cause it to be an ineffective prevention strategy for some crimes in the Bancroft neighborhood. Many incidents of vandalism, for instance, occur late at night, when no social surveillance would be expected. The fact that the majority of Bancroft's work-force commutes to work by car or bus limits the opportunity for social surveillance in Bancroft's residential areas during the day. This phenomenon is reflected by the spatial distribution of burglaries in the neighborhood.

A comprehensive CPTED program, while it cannot be expected to reduce crime dramatically, may affect people's perceptions of an area and affect the overall quality of life for residents in the neighborhood. The strongest emphasis should be placed on target

hardening, which has been shown to be the most effective and enduring component of CPTED. The emphasis should then be placed on improving the economic vitality and the "look and feel" of neighborhood commercial areas. If the neighborhood is interested in pursuing the creation of informal social surveillance, an effective implementation could be made in the alleyways in Bancroft. The community building aspect of CPTED is similar to the goals of the Bancroft Neighborhood Association. Already existing non-crime related activities and future events could be used for this purpose.

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